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Abstract
When citizens ask questions, how does their government answer? Requests for government
information confront officials with incentives both for and against disclosure. We argue
that officials seek to manage political risks in ways that favor requests from government-
aligned regions. We study responsiveness in the context of Mexico’s access-to-information
law, using publicly available data from several hundred thousand information requests filed
with Mexican federal government agencies between 2003 and 2015. Our empirical strat-
egy makes comparisons only among requests sent to similar agencies on similar topics at
similar times, while accounting for the complexity, sophistication, and sensitivity of indi-
vidual requests. We find that requests filed from locales with higher governing-party vote
shares receive more favorable responses, across multiple indicators of the nature and timing
of responses. Further, we find bias only for requests on publicly relevant topics, supporting a
mechanism of mitigating political risks over one of rewarding supporters with greater access
to benefits.
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Introduction
To whom are agents of accountability themselves accountable? Government officials charged
with responding to citizen queries and disclosing official information play a fundamental role
in downward “vertical accountability,” in which the state answers to citizens for its actions
(O’Donnell 1998; Schedler 1999). And yet, as agents of political principals—both their hierar-
chical superiors and elected politicians—they may face conflicting incentives to also be account-
able upwards, in ways that inhibit the provision of information to citizens. How do government
officials resolve these roles, and with what effects on responsiveness to citizens?
While many scholars have studied how electorally motivated discretion drives government
expenditures or public goods provision (Besley and Burgess 2002; Golden and Min 2013; Kra-
mon and Posner 2013; Stokes et al. 2013; Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez and Magaloni 2016; Carlitz
2017), government responsiveness extends beyond spending decisions: governments interface
with citizens in millions of everyday interactions, in which agents of the state may vary in their
responsiveness to citizen needs. We examine government responsiveness in one case of fre-
quent citizen-government interaction: responses to citizen requests for government information
in Mexico. To do so, we use a novel dataset incorporating every information request filed with
Mexican federal government agencies between 2003 and 2015.
Much like government expenditures, government information can be divided into particular-
istic and public categories. For instance, information useful in applying for government benefits
or employment serves the requester’s private interest, while information that reveals government
corruption or inefficiency serves the public’s interest in good governance. While this catego-
rization mirrors the public-private good distinction made in the distributive politics literature,
the provision of government information produces a different set of incentives for politicians
than does distributive spending, in particular because publicly relevant information can present
a political risk to the incumbent administration.
We thus focus attention on the distinct incentives at work in the specific domain of govern-
ment information. Officials charged with responding to citizens serve two distinct roles that are
central to democratic governance and accountability. First, they are gatekeepers for information
about government activities—from budgets to security to evidence of corruption—relevant for
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citizens’ retrospective evaluations of government performance, a central component of demo-
cratic accountability (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999). Second, they provide information
useful for guiding citizens’ everyday dealings with government agencies, such as applying for
benefits, acquiring titles or permits, or seeking government employment. As the timely access to
such information confers material advantages, it can become a currency of clientelism if granted
discretionarily according to partisanship (Stokes et al. 2013, 7). Following from these two roles,
discretionary non-disclosure of public information can either challenge political accountability
or can hinder the quality of governance by violating the principle of impartiality (Rothstein and
Teorell 2008) in the provision of public goods and services. It is the goal of this paper to assess
these two forms of discretionary disclosure.
For the agents of accountability at the heart of this process, motivations for responding pos-
itively include commitment to the goals of transparency as a tool for downward accountability,
as well as avoiding formal or informal sanctions through state institutions of horizontal account-
ability. They may also be motivated by partisan incentives to provide information that helps
political allies access state benefits or navigate regulatory processes. However, they also have
many reasons to be less responsive, particularly concerning the risk of unwanted disclosures re-
sulting in scandal or negative media attention that might harm the reputation of their agency’s
leadership or the political goals of the ruling party — both forms of upwards accountability.
How do officials manage these competing incentives regarding disclosure of government in-
formation? We argue that officials filter and discriminate based on the perceived political risk
of requests, informed by the partisan alignment of communities where requests originate. How-
ever, counter to the distributive politics literature, which expects discretionary targeting of private
goods, we argue that officials prioritize areas of core support in the provision of information that
is most publicly relevant. As the latter type of information presents a greater risk of generating
negative attention, politicians and their agents prefer to withhold this information from political
opponents where possible. We thus suggest that government responsiveness in the domain of
information, rather than spending or material goods, is better understood through such a logic of
managing risks rather than a logic of targeting benefits.
We test these expectations by comparing the quality of responses across requests originating
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from municipalities with varying levels of support for the governing party—but filed through the
same centralized and ostensibly anonymous system. We address heterogeneity in requests orig-
inating in areas of high and low governing-party support by considering variation only among
requests sent to the same government agency, on the same topic, and in the same year, and by
incorporating text-based information on the complexity, sensitivity, legalism, and sophistication
of individual requests. To control for the topics underlying requests, we use unsupervised topic
models to classify requests into twenty topics, which we categorize as either primarily publicly
relevant (e.g. budgets and spending, security issues, and environmental disputes) or primarily
related to private goals (e.g. accessing services and benefits, or seeking jobs or contracts).
We find evidence that requests filed from areas of stronger government support receive more
favorable responses: faster, less likely to claim the information does not exist, and less likely
to raise financial or physical barriers. These results are stronger among publicly relevant topics
than among topics with a more private focus, consistent with a mechanism of officials managing
political risk, and inconsistent with a mechanism of rewarding allies with preferential access to
material benefits. Further analyses reveal evidence of within-municipality variation in respon-
siveness over time, exploiting changes in political alignment after the Institutional Revolutionary
Party (PRI) regained presidential power in 2012.
Using qualitative evidence, we surmise that bias in responsiveness to information requests is
primarily due to officials inferring the political risk posed by a given request based on the traits
of the municipality from which it originates — information that is often readily available to the
bureaucrat. However, in some cases officials may be able to more precisely infer the identity
of the requester and thus discriminate against political opponents or notable watchdog groups.
Observationally, this more fine-grained discretion would yield the same results that we observe:
worse responses to information requests that come from areas where political opponents of the
ruling party predominate.
Interviews with bureaucrats at several liaison units charged with handling information re-
quests in government agencies illustrate that the types of discretion we elucidate are procedurally
feasible, and clarify the conflicting incentives presented by requests for government information.
While Mexico’s access-to-information (ATI) system was designed to “level the playing field” by
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anonymizing requests, liaison unit personnel report several informal avenues by which requester
traits can potentially become known and influence responsiveness. Further, officials described
both incentives favoring disclosure — such as avoiding sanctions for noncompliance or commit-
ment to the goals of the transparency law — as well as considerations of the political risk that
disclosure may pose to their supervisors and political principals, particularly for sensitive topics.
While we expect similar political dynamics to be at work in countries other than Mexico, this
context offers several advantages for our analysis. On a practical level, the online request system
offers richly detailed data over a long period of time. More crucially, as a federal democracy
with stable multi-party competition, Mexico presents significant regional variation in political
dynamics. Moreover, while Mexico has been at the vanguard among transitional democracies in
the design and implementation of ATI institutions, persistent corruption and bureaucratic discre-
tion introduce both motive and opportunity for biased responsiveness to information requests.
However, we expect that our findings would extend to other contexts where bureaucrats have
discretion in disclosing government information, yet face political risks in doing so.
Government Responsiveness and Information Disclosure
We combine insights from two literatures on government responsiveness. First, studies of
policy responsiveness address the extent to which government policies respond to voter prefer-
ences (Golden and Min 2013). Such studies focus on partisan incentives that shape government
spending and public goods provision, typically across subnational units (Besley and Burgess
2002; Magaloni 2006; Cleary 2007). A central debate in this literature regards how politicians
allocate benefits between areas of ruling- and opposition-party strength (Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez
and Magaloni 2016; Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter 2014; Stokes et al. 2013).
A second group analyzes individual responsiveness, the extent to which individual citizen
needs are met in everyday interactions with the state. Recent studies have identified bias re-
garding citizens’ inferred race, ethnicity, gender, and social status (Butler and Broockman 2011;
McClendon 2015; White, Nathan and Faller 2015; Distelhorst and Hou 2014). Studies of re-
sponsiveness to information requests, the present focus, have identified differences based on the
threat of collective action in China (Chen, Pan and Xu 2015) and the design of government agen-
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cies in the United States (Wood and Lewis 2017). And studies of ATI in Mexico specifically
have identified limited favoritism of citizens with implied political connections (Lagunes and
Pocasangre 2019)1 and biases against citizens seeking information about the drug war (Alman-
zar, Aspinwall and Crow 2017). Yet we lack understanding of how broader partisan objectives
shape bureaucratic responsiveness in interactions with individual citizens.
ATI institutions enable citizens to request information from public officials, and obligate of-
ficials to respond, subject to certain legal exemptions. In practice, officials operate in conditions
of limited capacity (in terms of staff, finances, and records-management systems), substantial
discretion, and inconsistent oversight, making ATI institutions a promising venue to study re-
sponsiveness. Further, they generate data about responsiveness across two quite different areas
of citizen activity: private goals for the benefit of the requester, and public goals related to
governance and accountability (Michener and Worthy 2015). Information requests in the for-
mer category include, for example, questions about how to access government benefits or pro-
grams, conduct bureaucratic procedures, or seek government contracts or jobs. Public goals,
on the other hand, include investigating corruption, patronage, or other wrongdoing, evaluating
decision-making or policy effectiveness, and mobilizing for political action. Similar to stud-
ies that find different targeting logics for different types of distributive goods (Albertus 2012;
Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez and Magaloni 2016; Kramon and Posner 2013; Palmer-Rubin 2016), we
postulate that public and private varieties of information generate different incentive structures
for officials.
As shown in Table 1, certain incentives favor responsiveness across both public and pri-
vate information. Disclosure of requested information provides citizens a positive impression
of government performance. Officials may feel committed to complying with legal mandates or
the ethos of transparency, or may wish to avoid sanction for nondisclosure, either within their
agencies or from oversight bodies. Officials also have reasons to be unresponsive to all types of
information requests. Aside from standard criteria for withholding information (confidentiality,
national security, commercial secrets, etc.), bureaucrats may be discretionarily unresponsive out
of an interest in minimizing workloads, particularly in understaffed agencies.
1A similar study in Brazil (Michener and Rodrigues 2015) found no such biases.
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Table 1: Incentives For and Against Information Disclosure
Incentives for Disclosure Incentives against Disclosure




with legal exemptions; Manag-
ing political risks





However, other potential incentives, denoted in italics, are specific to the type of informa-
tion. A core consideration in disclosing public information is political risk: the potential of the
requested information to damage the reputation of the agency, its leadership, or the governing
party. Political elites from the ruling party clearly wish to avoid scandals, investigations, or infor-
mation revelations in the media that might harm themselves or their allies. Agency leaders also
seek to protect their own future political careers. These considerations weigh against disclosure
for topics of information that pose greater political risks. In contrast, for information related to
private goals, disclosure might follow a logic of targeting benefits, as does distributive spending,
strategically disclosing information that helps the requester get a job, win a contract, or receive
government benefits, in order to reward supporters and punish opposition.
Officials responding to information requests consider both their own interests (including in-
dividual career goals and organizational reputation) and the interests of their political principals.
The prevalence of political appointees and patronage in bureaucratic agencies produces depen-
dence on the governing political party’s interests. We thus expect that officials responding to
information requests operate, at least in part, as agents of the party controlling the presidency,
and act in accordance with their political interest.
Both public and private goals can be furthered by favoring co-partisans. Officials can dis-
criminate directly in cases of known requesters, or use the political alignment of the location
from which a request originates to infer the likelihood that the requester is an “ally” or “adver-
sary.” Either case means that officials respond in ways that disproportionately favor government
supporters and government-supporting areas. Thus, our Partisan Discretion Hypothesis predicts
that, across all types of requests, those from government-supporting areas receive more favorable
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responses than those from opposition-supporting areas.
We further pose two subsidiary and competing hypotheses, regarding whether such partisan
discretion follows a logic of targeting benefits or one of mitigating political risk. A naive de-
ployment of findings from the distributive politics literature would predict a strategy based on
targeting benefits. As such, if officials manipulate disclosure decisions as part of a clientelistic
strategy to target voters with particularistic benefits (Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez and Magaloni 2016;
Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter 2014; Stokes et al. 2013), we would expect to see stronger
effects for topics of information requests that contribute to private, rather than public goals. The
Targeting Benefits Hypothesis predicts that partisan effects are stronger for requests on topics of
information about private needs or benefits than about information with public potential.
In light of the above discussion about the acute political risk posed by disclosure of informa-
tion with public relevance, however, we have reason to expect the opposite. Given the high costs
associated with scandal weighed against the marginal payoff for helping allies access benefits—
as well as incentives to appear impartial and maintain high response rates—we hypothesize that
officials may exercise more discretion in disclosing information that poses political risks than
that which generates private benefits. Therefore, the Mitigating Risk Hypothesis predicts that
partisan effects are stronger for requests on topics of information with public potential than
about private needs or benefits.
Access to Information in Mexico
Mexico’s Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública Gubernamen-
tal (LFTAIPG) passed in June 2002, taking effect one year later. An ATI law was a campaign
promise of President Vicente Fox’s Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) in the watershed 2000 pres-
idential election. Although Fox initially proposed weak draft legislation, sustained civil society,
media, and opposition pressure contributed to the ultimate passage of a law with cross-party
support, widely hailed as one of the world’s strongest (Pinto 2009; Michener 2011; Berliner and
Erlich 2015). The law’s implementation and wide usage is seen as a model among developing
countries (Bookman and Guerrero Amparán 2009; Michener 2011).
Notably, the ATI law created an independent information commission, the Instituto Federal
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de Acceso a la Información (IFAI),2 tasked with promoting the new law, monitoring compliance,
and resolving appeals. IFAI also created a centralized online information portal through which
government agencies manage requests. Citizens file requests and receive responses almost exclu-
sively (97% of all requests) through this portal, known as INFOMEX until 2016. When citizens
do file handwritten requests (only 3% of all cases), INFOMEX agency officials manage these
and enter the relevant information into the portal’s database.
When a request is filed, it arrives from the INFOMEX system first to the unidad de enlace,
or transparency liaison unit, within the government agency to which the request was directed.
The unit’s staff reviews the request and directs it to the relevant administrative units within the
agency, unless simple or frequent enough that it can be handled directly. Administrative units
then return preliminary responses to the liaison unit, with further communication if necessary
before responses are returned via INFOMEX. Most agencies manage these internal processes
using combinations of emails and spreadsheets, with only ten percent reporting automated man-
agement systems even as late as 2016 (Ríos Cázares, Castañeda and García 2017). Each agency
also has an internal information committee that reviews and approves some categories of denial
or deadline extensions. The head of the liaison unit sits on the information committee, along
with a representative of the agency head and an internal control officer.3 This creates a formal
venue for discussions around how to respond; although informal discussions can also take place.
While several observers claim that INFOMEX maintains requester anonymity (Sobel et al.
2006; Guerrero-Amparan and Toledo 2009; Mizrahi and Mendiburu 2012), this is not generally
the case. Indeed, Lagunes and Pocasangre (2019) observe that “While Mexico’s FOIA system is
supposed to be identity-blind, we rarely see instances in which the identity of the individual is
blacked out from requests.” And Fox and Haight (2007, p. 40) note that “At first, the IFAI tried
to prevent agencies from accessing personal data in SISI [INFOMEX’s earlier name] accounts,
however agencies insisted on knowing who was requesting information. The IFAI accepted this
position, in the absence of a legal basis for defending the anonymity of requestors.”
2In 2015, its name changed to INAI.
3Several procedural details were changed by a 2016 reform, but this paper refers to the situ-
ation during the period under study.
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Individuals must create an account to use INFOMEX, and provide not only their name and
contact information but also their physical address. This requester information can be seen
by liaison unit staff who first receive requests and distribute them within their agency. Some
agencies use specialized software to keep requester information out of internal communications,
but most do not. A 2016 survey of liaison units found that 99 percent reported communicating
about requests over email and 86 percent over telephone (Ríos Cázares, Castañeda and García
2017, p. 61). Even where specialized software exists, however, anonymity is not guaranteed. In
one large, cabinet-level ministry, liaison unit staff claimed that their internal system did allow
other officials to see full requester information.4
This complicated situation regarding requester information leaves several avenues for dis-
crimination, either by specific requester identity (which would only sometimes be informative,
and which we cannot observe in the publicly-available data) or by location (which is both system-
atically informative and which we can observe). First, officials in the liaison unit—who can for-
mally see requester information—might alter the speed or nature of initial decisions based on the
requester. Second, the agency’s information committee might make different decisions regarding
extensions or claims of classification, confidentiality, or nonexistence of the requested informa-
tion. Third, other officials may see requester information despite mandates to the contrary, due to
the agency’s internal procedures or informal pressure. Several interviewees suggested that other
officials indeed attempt to find out information about the requester (and potentially incorporate
such information into their decisions), and are sometimes successful.
There is a clear incentive for selective disclosure, as information requests often lead to public
scandals or negative media coverage. For instance, newspaper stories frequently reference the
use of information requests in reporting and investigation. These include information on poten-
tial misuse of funds,5 public employees lacking qualifications,6 irregularities in procurement or
4Interviews were conducted with officials in the liaison units of seven different government
agencies in March 2017, under [institution name] IRB number 00005773.
5Reforma, Feb. 28, 2005, “Acusan anomalías en gasto de GDF.”; Reforma, March 20, 2015,
“Financian en Pemex tarjetazos a directivos Conserva plana mayor beneficios pese a crisis.”
6Reforma, April 11, 2014, “Detecta SAT a 12 funcionarios ‘cachirules.’ ”
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handling of supplies,7 and even to investigate potential arbitrary detention by police forces and
the discovery of mass graves.8
In managing the political risks of disclosure, officials face conflicting incentives. Interviewed
liaison unit officials emphasized both their commitment to the law and to serving citizens, and
their fear of “getting in trouble” with IFAI, or of attracting negative attention to the agency
for poor compliance records—all incentives in favor of disclosure. But officials also discussed
political considerations. One official said that, for some sensitive requests (often relating to
patronage spending), higher-level officials simply order the denial of the request, leaving the
liaison unit to come up with a defensible justification. Another said that agency leadership
sometimes argue directly with the information committee in favor of denying specific requests.
The head of yet another liaison unit directly invoked the reputation of the head of the agency,
saying “we have to take care of the secretary . . . we have to protect him.”
A 2007 survey (CIDE 2007) of 1,221 high level staff at 150 federal entities further demon-
strates these mixed incentives. The survey found 73% agreeing that “the federal government
should give access to all the information that it generates” (p. 37) and 76% aware of sanctions
for noncompliance, 29% of whom cited suspension as a likely penalty (p. 26). Yet at the same
time, 53% reported that they were justified in withholding requested information when they sus-
pected the information could be used to attack the agency (p. 43), and respondents were broadly
aware of a variety of strategies to withhold information, such as declaring it nonexistent or the
responsibility of another agency, or requiring the requester to collect a physical copy (p. 44).
While government agencies and their officials do not directly face electoral incentives, they
cannot remain fully independent of them either. Top agency leadership are appointees account-
able directly to the President, and often seek to protect their own reputations in pursuit of future
political advancement. Liaison unit heads are frequently replaced, although in some cases they
remain in place through presidential transitions (even in 2012). Lower-level staff within each
7Reforma, Jan. 22, 2008, “Indagan pérdidas por medicina caduca.”; El Universal, January
29, 2013, “Piden a PF informar precio de flota vehicular.”
8Reforma, Feb. 6, 2015, “Hallan 100 cuerpos y nadie investiga!”; Reforma, Nov. 4, 2012,
“Aumenta arraigo, no las condenas.”
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unit, particularly those with substantial experience or legal expertise, are more likely to remain
in place through a transition. Nearly all relevant staff to this process are empleados de con-
fianza—technically patronage appointees who may be fired at will, despite usually pursuing
longer-term careers in the public sector, and thus face incentives to protect their principals’ rep-
utations. One interviewed official even noted liaison unit directors had been fired in the past for
disclosing information that displeased agency leadership.
A 2016 survey of liaison units (Ríos Cázares, Castañeda and García 2017, p. 58-61) found
that 88% of unit directors (and 76% of responsible staff) were empleados de confianza (with the
bulk of the remainder being even less secure temporary employees), averaging 91 (93) months
in the agency, and 33 (57) months in the response unit, respectively. Nearly all had at least
undergraduate degrees, while roughly 40% of directors had either masters or doctorate degrees.
The average response unit had 4-5 staff, including the director. A survey of officials at the ATI
system’s founding (Gill and Hughes 2005, p. 132) found that “nearly one-half of respondents
thought government officials would only partially comply with the new access law and said
potential sanction by superiors, or the fear of such sanction, would prompt non-compliance.”
Furthermore, given a policy requiring that unit directors report directly to the agency head, these
ATI authorities are usually high-level agency officials, invested in the well-being of the agency
and its leadership (Ríos Cázares, Castañeda and García 2017, p. 52).
Sample, Preprocessing, and Text Analysis
We focus on Mexico’s publicly available administrative data containing all ATI requests filed
with federal government agencies during the period from June 2003 (when the law came into
effect) through August 2015, as made available by the Mexican government via INFOMEX.9
These records contain detailed information on each request, including the date and time filed,
the agency to which the request is directed, the full request text, the date of response, the nature
of the response, and links to attached files associated with the request or response. Another
field differentiates electronic requests (97% of the total) from manual requests filed on paper
9This excludes state-level authorities and constitutionally autonomous bodies, as these fall
under different legal regimes.
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and entered electronically by officials. While the publicly available data protect the identities of
requesters by omitting names, user IDs, or answers to voluntary demographic questions, these
data do include geographic information on a requester’s state and municipality, selected from
‘drop-down’ menus of pre-defined options, thereby preventing misspellings.
While INFOMEX cannot prevent individuals from entering false information, misrepresen-
tations of requesters’ locations appears to be relatively rare, as there is a strong relationship
between municipality size and request volume. Across municipalities, the logged total number
of requests filed and logged population are correlated at 0.76. If a large share of requesters
were selecting false locations, we would not observe such a strong relationship. Further, any
measurement error in this regard simply sets a higher bar for us to identify meaningful results.
The text of each request corresponds to the requester’s own open-ended description of the
information they seek. While the majority of requesters described the nature of their requests
within one of two primary text fields, roughly 13% of cases included either some or all of the
request as a file attachment. We implemented an automated routine to download these based on
links contained in the INFOMEX data, convert to machine-readable text, and incorporate into
our corpus. We also removed all official requests for confidential requester personal informa-
tion.10 Finally, as a small number of requests were extremely long, often where an attached file
contained an example report or a large spreadsheet, we truncated any request over 1,000 words,
affecting only 0.02% of requests.
We applied a set of preprocessing techniques to convert our final corpus of requests into a
collection of individual “documents” compatible with the unsupervised topic models used below,
as well as to fix common typos, standardize the use of accents, and remove any non-graphical
characters. We then processed each request text to remove all punctuation, numbers, names of
months, and stopwords. The removal of these character-sets is standard preprocessing for our
topic model techniques (e.g. Roberts et al. 2014) and helps to eliminate extremely common, but
highly uninformative, character strings. We also removed common phrases used by requesters
to indicate that the information request is not provided in the text field, but rather is attached.
10While these use INFOMEX, they are governed by different legal requirements, and addi-
tionally do not make public their request texts.
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Next, we omitted sparse terms that do not occur in at least 0.1% of the documents in our corpus,
which is a common means of eliminating extremely rare words that offer little insight into the
shared topics across one’s text corpus (Quinn et al. 2010; Grimmer 2012). Finally, all remaining
words were converted to lower case, stemmed, and re-structured into a document-term-corpus
before analysis. Altogether, these preprocessing steps created a corpus with 1,023,267 processed
request documents and 6,696 total unique words.
To uncover the different topics of interest to citizens making information requests, we use
Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA; Blei, Ng and Jordan 2003). LDA is an unsupervised topic
model that identifies latent dimensions of texts. LDA estimates such topics via a hierarchical
Bayesian model that treats documents as a finite mixture of underlying topics, and topics as a
mixture over a latent set of topic probabilities (Blei, Ng and Jordan 2003, 993). In this manner,
each identified topic can be characterized by a set of words that LDA determines as having the
highest probability of association with that topic. These topic-word associations can then be
used to (i) interpret each topic for its substantive meaning and/or (ii) to classify one’s documents
in terms of the topic(s) most likely to have generated each document, based upon its observed
distribution of words.
With LDA, the analyst must explicitly choose the number of topics, k, to be estimated. In
Appendix B, we evaluate different approaches to this choice, and identify a k = 20 as most
appropriate for this application based on both qualitative evaluation and quantitative model fit
statistics. We then estimate an LDA model on our full corpus of 1,023,267 preprocessed request
texts. For this LDA model, in addition to setting k = 20, we assign the model’s α parameter
to favor the assignment of a single topic to each document,11 and use Gibbs sampling for es-
timation. As such, this LDA model identifies the 20 topics that best characterize the request
texts across the entire 2003-2015 period. We then classify each request according to its single
most “dominant” associated topic (although we also utilize each request’s full set of twenty topic
probabilities in our analyses).
In Appendix C, we discuss an extensive set of evaluations aimed at interpreting these topics,
including examination of the words most representative of each topic, and a close reading of sev-
11We further justify this choice in Appendix B.
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eral hundred individual requests sampled from those strongly associated with each topic. These
interpretations are developed further in Berliner, Bagozzi and Palmer-Rubin (2018). Based on
these evaluations, we split these twenty topics into two sets: thirteen topics with higher pub-
lic potential, and seven topics oriented towards more private goals. These are listed in Table
2. We describe our LDA estimation strategy, and dominant topic approach, in further detail in
Appendices B and C.
By topics with higher public potential we mean those that pose greater political risk to gov-
ernment entities. These include issues such as budgets and spending, crime and violence, envi-
ronmental impacts, oil and utilities, distributive social programs, public procurement, and a topic
capturing requests asking for information about specific public servants. These have clear po-
litically relevant uses for investigation, oversight, media scrutiny, or political organizations. Re-
quests on budgets and spending or on distributive programs might be aimed at identifying misuse
of resources or favoritism. Requests about local environmental impact, permits for construction
projects, or on decision procedures and compliance evaluations for government contracts might
be aimed at uncovering corruption in allocating contracts and permits, or non-compliance with
legal rules. Details on the scale of violence and the conduct of police and military in the “Drug
War,” or on the qualifications of public officials, both also have clear potential to generate nega-
tive media attention or potential scandals. While even in these topics we still find some requests
that are not likely filed with public goals, it is nonetheless these categories of requests that are
most likely to activate a consideration of potential negative political consequences by officials.
Topics with lower public potential primarily reflect individual citizen needs, commercial in-
terests, and demand for aggregate statistics. These pose less risk of generating negative media
or investigative attention. For example, one topic largely comprises requests for information
to fulfill individual citizen needs, such as how to access specific government services or how
to complete specific procedures. Another primarily comprises requests for aggregate statistics
pertaining to specific medical conditions. Relatively legalistic and sophisticated requests for
commercial information, likely filed by companies themselves for private purposes, dominate a
third topic. And while we identify other topics focusing on public employees as having higher
public potential (due to a focus on specific individuals or qualifications that might be used to
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identify unqualified patronage hiring), another topic is primarily made up of requests seeking
information on aggregate salary scales, benefits, and pensions – likely filed by employees them-
selves.
In Appendix C, we describe all twenty topics in more detail, provide example requests, and
explain our categorization of them as mainly “public" or mainly “private.” This division of topics
is not absolute: an individual request for budget information might be mundane and apolitical,
while a request pertaining to aggregate statistics might be aimed at evaluating government per-
formance. However, these divisions nonetheless enable the testing of our second hypothesis
by capturing the set of requests that are more likely to trigger political risk-management pro-
cesses on the part of government officials. As a robustness check (Appendix A), we also analyze
only the most clearly private topic—Individual Needs—and the most clearly sensitive topic—
Military, Police, and Crime—individually.
Table 2: Twenty Topics of Requested Information
Topic Label Percent of Requests
Environment and Land 8.64
Individual Needs 8.50
Budgets and Spending 7.98
Commercial Information 7.86
Distributive Programs 7.06
Military, Police, and Crime 6.84
Government Employees 1: Salaries and Benefits 6.71
Government Employees 2: Functions and Qualifications 6.26
Energy and Public Utilities 5.65
Internal Procedures and Official Documents 5.19
Medical Statistics 4.67
Government Employees 3: Specific Personnel 4.10
Public Procurement 1: Service Providers 4.09
Banking, Finance, and Taxes 3.83
Education 3.66
Medical Supplies 1: Contracts and Suppliers 2.82
Public Procurement 2: Procedures and Documents 2.32
Public Procurement 3: Anti-Corruption 2.03
Medical Supplies 2: Purchases and Spending 1.24
Medical Supplies 3: Inventories 0.56
Note: Twenty topics in order from largest to smallest after assigning each request to one primary





We are interested in government responsiveness to citizen information requests. In the con-
text of information requests, responsiveness is the extent to which citizens receive the informa-
tion they seek, in useful form, and in a timely fashion, except in cases legitimately subject to
legal exemptions from disclosure. Given the complexities in defining and measuring these char-
acteristics, we use information on both the timing and types of responses to triangulate across
different possible measures of “non-responsiveness.”
First, we measure the time-to-response in working days. In calculating this variable, we ex-
clude weekends as well as official Mexican government holidays. However, given the presence
of legal time limits for responses, we also employ two dichotomous measures of whether or not
the response was late. While the statutory deadline was twenty working days, officials could
request extension of up to forty working days. We use both of these thresholds to construct sepa-
rate indicators of late responses. Across the whole dataset, 66.4% of requests received responses
within 20 working days, while 89.3% of requests received responses within 40 working days.
Although a late response may still provide the requested information, many information requests
concern time-sensitive matters, particularly when publicly relevant. Further, delays often reflect
a sensitive request that required greater intra-agency negotiation, either with the liaison unit or
information committee.
We then employ three different measures of the type of response, based on information pro-
vided by officials categorizing the nature of their responses. Here we must confront two is-
sues: First, that requests may be denied for legally allowable reasons, and second, that state
agents themselves categorize their response types, and may not always do so accurately. Fox,
Haight and Palmer-Rubin (2011), for example, find that some responses (from the 2003-2005
period) were categorized as positive with information delivered electronically, but the actual
electronic attachments contain written justifications for not delivering the requested informa-
tion. Nonetheless, they still concluded that for responses classified as positive, “information was
actually provided in a satisfactory manner approximately 87 percent of the time” (Fox, Haight
and Palmer-Rubin 2011, p. 9).
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We thus focus first on responses categorized as “Inexistencia de la información solicitada,”
claiming that the requested information does not exist, making up 5.9% of all responses. Ac-
cording to Fox, Haight and Palmer-Rubin (2011, p. 11), this is “the category of denial that leaves
the greatest opening for agency opacity.” They found that many agencies denied requests under
this category without written justification, concluding that “agencies have discovered that this
is the least risky way to deny requests for information in cases where they did not want it re-
leased or when assembling it would be a large burden,” especially since “in contrast, the burden
of proof is on the agency if it claims that information requested is ‘confidential’ or ‘reserved”’
(Fox, Haight and Palmer-Rubin 2011, p. 14). Thus, while a denial for other reasons may well be
legitimate under the law, we consider the “Inexistencia” responses to be more clearly examples
of unresponsive state agents.
Second, we construct another dependent variable for responses categorized as either “Neg-
ativa por ser reservada o confidencial” or “Información parcialmente reservada o confidencial,”
indicating that the information requested is either fully or partially classified or confidential. Al-
though many of these denials will be justified, there may be political bias on the margins. These
responses account for 3.6% of the total.
Finally, we construct a dependent variable to capture situations where officials do disclose
the requested information, but in a non-electronic form that creates additional financial or phys-
ical barriers to the requester. Whereas the majority of positive responses are categorized as
“Entrega de información en medio electrónico,” meaning the information was delivered elec-
tronically, some are physically shipped (requiring the requester to first pay a fee), while oth-
ers require the requester to physically appear at a government office. These place additional
burdens on the requester (and further compromise their anonymity) that in some cases may
be prohibitive—indeed several thousand requests appear abandoned in the INFOMEX system,
without the requester having ever paid the shipping fee. Lagunes and Pocasangre (2019), dis-
cussing the burdensome procedure required to make such payments, suggest that “charging a fee
may be a strategy to impede access to information or at least discourage citizens from pursuing
a request.” We capture these cases with three categories of responses: “Notificación de envío”
(shipping notification), “Notificación lugar y fecha de entrega” (place and date to pick up the in-
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formation), and “Respuesta del solicitante a la notificación de entrega de información con costo”
(awaiting the requester paying the fee). Together, these types of responses account for 4.9% of
the total.
Each of these dependent variables captures different dimensions of responsiveness on which
we might expect to see political bias in accordance with our hypotheses. As an initial visualiza-
tion of these measures of responsiveness in relation to political alignment, Figures 2 and 3 plot
each measure against state-level vote shares.12 Figure 2 plots average responsiveness to requests
in each state, over the period up until the 2012 presidential election, against the state-level PAN
vote share averaged between the 2000 and 2006 presidential elections. Figure 3, in turn, plots av-
erage responsiveness over the period after newly elected PRI President Enrique Peña Nieto took
office in December 2012, against state-level PRI vote share in the 2012 presidential election.
In each case except one, the line-of-best-fit slopes downwards, suggesting that areas of higher
governing party support tended to receive better responses. However, our subsequent approach
moves beyond the state-level to use the individual request as the unit of analysis.
Independent Variables
Our primary independent variable captures political alignment at the municipality level. For
each information request, this variable takes the value of the governing party’s vote share in the
municipality of origin, in the previous presidential election. Here, we first match each request to
the municipality from which it was sent and to corresponding municipality-level data on presi-
dential election vote shares. The resulting variable, Government Vote Share, reflects PAN vote
share from the elections of Vicente Fox (2000-2006) and Felipe Calderón (2006-2012), and PRI
vote share from the election of Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018).
12We omit Morelos, as a Morelos-based group filed thousands of highly unusual requests (see
Appendix C) whose more negative responses heavily influenced the state’s averages. While we
do not omit Morelos from our subsequent analyses, our results are similar if we do.
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Figure 1: State-level averages for six different measures of responsiveness, plotted against state-
level governing party vote shares. Response measures are averages for all requests filed in each
state over the period up until the 2012 presidential election. Vote shares are PAN vote share
averaged between the 2000 and 2006 presidential elections. Dashed line is a line-of-best-fit
from a linear regression of response (state averages) on state vote share. Morelos omitted as an
outlier (see footnote 12).
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Figure 2: State-level averages for six different measures of responsiveness, plotted against state-
level governing party vote shares. Response measures are averages for all requests filed in each
state over the period after newly elected PRI president Enrique Peña Nieto took office in De-
cember 2012. Vote shares are PRI vote share in the 2012 presidential election. Dashed line is a
line-of-best-fit from a linear regression of response (state averages) on state vote share. Morelos
omitted as an outlier (see footnote 12).
22
We control for the logged population of each municipality to avoid confounding by differ-
ences in requests from large urban areas and smaller rural locales. We also control for the logged
“economic marginality” of each municipality, an index of economic and demographic indicators,
to ensure that the effect of governing party political support is not merely proxying for underly-
ing economic differences.
We also include several request-level measures, in order to capture features of requests that
may influence the nature of official responses. First, we control for all twenty sets of topic
probabilities, reflecting the extent to which each request contains words associated with each of
the twenty different potential topics of request texts. We include indicators of whether or not
each request included an attached file, and the medium of each request (electronic or physical),
although nearly all are electronic. We also measure the (logged) word count of each request, and
the (logged) ratio of characters to words. This ratio of characters to words is included as a proxy
for “readability,” a measure of the complexity of text.
We also measure two other features of requests that might reflect their complexity or sophistication—
legalism and punctuation. Some information requests are highly legalistic, citing provisions of
the ATI law or otherwise conveying a level of expertise on the part of the requester that might
influence the ways that officials respond. Other requests are clearly filed by individuals with
little political sophistication, use very ordinary language, and often omitting punctuation. To
capture legalism, we first count the number of times each request includes a series of words or
phrases that reflect references to the ATI law or related legal provisions,13 and then measure this
count as a ratio of the length of each request. We also measure the incidence of punctuation14 as
a ratio of the length of each request.
To measure the investigative risk of individual requests in a more fine-grained manner be-
yond topics, we constructed a “Corruption Discourse Index” using a dictionary of words drawn
from newspaper articles. We first identified over 300,000 articles from two major newspapers
13These are: “ley federal de transparencia,” “ley de transparencia,” “artículo,” “fracción,” “su-
jeto obligado,” and “LFTAIPG”—both with and without accents where relevant and regardless
of case.
14Periods, commas, colons, semicolons, question marks, and inverted question marks.
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(Reforma and El Universal) mentioning any of twenty large federal agencies with unambigious
names and abbreviations. We then developed a set of eighteen search terms pertaining to corrup-
tion or scandal, and identified the set of articles containing such terms. We used these to produce
a dictionary of 4,568 words that were distinctive to the corruption articles, as compared to the
non-corruption articles about the same agencies. Each information request, in turn, was scored
with the proportion of words that matched this dictionary. As expected, this measure on its own
is strongly associated with worse responses.
We also control for a potentially relevant time-varying factor at the agency level, calculat-
ing a measure of “agency workload” to capture the (logged) number requests received over the
preceding thirty days. For each agency, this variable takes a different value on each day of the
period under study, reflecting the fact that officials facing a larger “queue” of pending requests
may respond in different ways. We also include indicators for each month of the year, to capture
any seasonal trends in response patterns.
Finally, we include a set of fixed effects for each government agency (thereby making only
within-agency comparisons for requests from different regions of the country), each year (to
capture across-the-board time trends), and each “dominant” topic category (reflecting the topic
with the highest probability of association with each request). Rather than including these fixed
effects separately (which we show in Appendix A), we employ a separate fixed effect for ev-
ery single agency-topic-year combination. That is, our models make comparisons only among
requests filed with the same agency, on the same topic, and in the same year—but from differ-
ent parts of the country with varying political alignment. For example, comparisons are made
among requests filed with the environmental ministry, on the topic of budgets and spending, in
the year 2008—but not across different topics of information in requests filed with that same
ministry, and not across requests for budget and spending information in requests filed with
different ministries, and not across different time periods. This distinction is important, as we
do not wish to assume that each government agency has the same baseline procedures for re-
sponding to different topics of requests, or to assume that changes in internal procedures over
time took place according to identical timelines across agencies. These very fine-grained fixed
effects automatically capture the effect of any omitted variable that varies across agency-topic-
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year combinations, and allow us to more closely approximate the level of comparability that
would be obtained in an experimental approach.
Sample and Modeling Approaches
Rather than using the entire sample of over one million requests, we carefully select the set
of requests for which our hypotheses are most appropriate. First, we omit the roughly half of all
requests originating from the Federal District, where Mexico City is located. Given the prepon-
derance of media, political, legal, and civil society organizations filing requests in the capital, we
would be concerned that these requests are less comparable with those in the rest of the country,
would make the municipality of origin a less reliable proxy for the likely political alignment
of the requester, and would potentially lead to misleading results given the high support for the
PRD in the capital city. However, results remain highly similar when we instead retain Federal
District observations (Appendix A). Second, we omit agencies that only rarely receive requests,
as their responses are likely to be more idiosyncratic. We include only agencies that received, on
average, more than one request per week. While this retains only 189 of 304 possible agencies, it
removes only 36,074 requests, a small fraction of the total. Results remain highly similar when
we retain these (Appendix A). Third, to avoid any bias from “right-censoring,” we remove any
requests filed after May 1, 2015 or otherwise unresponded to by our August 2015 cutoff. Finally,
we omit all requests filed in the period between July 1, 2012—the date of the 2012 presidential
election—and the end of 2012 when the new PRI President Enrique Peña Nieto took office.15
For purposes of evaluating the effects of political alignment, this period is likely to be idiosyn-
cratic, and it is not clear which party’s supporters we would expect potential political bias to
favor. The resulting sample includes 456,747 individual requests.
We employ two main modeling approaches. The first is to model responses as a function of
the previously mentioned covariates, making cross-municipality comparisons between requests
sent from areas of varying political alignment. By including fixed effects for each agency-topic-
year combination, we account for potential unobserved confounders on those dimensions. Our
15Although the new president took office December 1, 2012, we exclude requests through
December 31, 2012, to ensure that indicators for 2012 do not extend across two separate admin-
istrations.
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second approach instead leverages changes in political alignment over time, adding fixed effects
for municipalities and removing fixed effects for each year. This approach takes into account only
the over-time variation in political alignment between municipalities and the central government,
primarily arising from the change in the governing party after 2012.
For both these approaches we employ linear probability models, as employing categorical
models with such a large number of fixed effects poses problems for both computation and
interpretation.16
Results
Table 3 presents our main set of results, including the previously discussed control vari-
ables and fixed effects for every agency-topic-year combination. For five of the six dependent
variables, the coefficient for government vote share is negative and statistically significant at
p < .05. Only for classified/confidential responses is the coefficient not significant. Notably,
the inclusion of fixed effects means that this analysis already accounts for any unobserved varia-
tion at the level of agencies, topics, years, or any combinations thereof, as well as controlling for
other municipality-level factors, request-level complexity, sensitivity, and sophistication, and the
time-varying workload of each agency. These results offer strong support in favor of the Partisan
Discretion Hypothesis. Ministry personnel do in fact appear to exercise discretion in responding
to information requests, favoring request from areas of core support. But which political logic
drives this discretionary behavior—favoring allies with access to benefits, or keeping potentially
damaging information out of the hands of opponents?
To adjudicate between the Targeting Benefits Hypothesis and the Mitigating Risk Hypothesis,
we examine whether political effects of government vote share appear differentially for topics of
requests with higher and lower public potential. Table 4 presents results of models restricting the
sample to only topics we categorized as having higher public potential (this and all subsequent
tables display only the main coefficients of interest, although all controls from Table 3 are still
included). All negative coefficients are greater in magnitude. Table 5 restricts the sample to only
16In Appendix A, we show logit results for robustness. In all models, we employ two-way
clustered standard errors by both municipality and agency.
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topics categorized as having lower public potential. In this case, only one of the coefficients
is statistically significant.17 These results suggest that greater political targeting of responses
takes place for topics of information that pose potential political risks, and not for politically
mundane or purely private topics of information. This finding is thus more consistent with the
Mitigating Risk Hypothesis than the Targeting Benefits Hypothesis. In Appendix A, we also
show results employing an interaction term between Government Vote Share and the indicator
of higher public potential. The coefficient on the interaction term is negative in all cases, and
statistically significant for four of the six models.
In Appendix A, we present additional robustness checks for our main findings from Table 4,
including the following. First, we include in the sample requests from the Federal District, which
do not substantially change our results. Second, we measure the main independent variable in
several alternate ways, including using state-level rather than municipal-level vote shares (in case
officials incorporate information about political alignment at a more geographically aggregated
level), or measuring the governing party’s vote margin over the next-largest party rather than
vote share, or using vote shares from mayoral elections in each municipality (though these are
more limited in data availability) rather than in presidential elections. Results from these models
remain largely in line with our primary results. Third, we control for measures that capture the
extent to which a locale represents a “swing” district, as a potential alternate hypothesis to ours
might be that officials target better responses to such areas, in attempt to provide valuable ser-
vices or better demonstrate government performance. We alternately use the Effective Number
of Parties in presidential vote shares of each municipality, or the closeness of the vote margin
between the nationally-governing party and the largest other party. In either case, the coefficient
for the “swing” variable is close to zero, and not statistically significant, in all six models.
17A coefficient equality test shows that the coefficients for government vote share in Tables 4

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Dependent Variable LogDays Late20 Late40 Inexist. Classif. NonElec.
Gov. Vote Share −0.162∗∗ −0.049∗∗ −0.030∗∗ −0.019∗∗ −0.000 −0.021∗∗
(0.040) (0.014) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
DV Mean 2.593 0.346 0.109 0.062 0.033 0.038
Num. obs. 305115 305115 305115 305115 305115 305115
Adj. R2 0.334 0.251 0.173 0.121 0.096 0.098
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 4: Models of government responsiveness to information requests, with sample restricted
to topics with higher public potential. Models additionally include the same control variables
as in Table 3, twenty topic probabilities, monthly indicators, and fixed effects for every agency-
topic-year combination. Two-way clustered standard errors on municipality and agency.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Dependent Variable LogDays Late20 Late40 Inexist. Classif. NonElec.
Gov. Vote Share −0.052 0.005 −0.009 −0.014∗ 0.012 0.006
(0.053) (0.019) (0.012) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011)
DV Mean 2.500 0.303 0.083 0.045 0.030 0.050
Num. obs. 151632 151632 151632 151632 151632 151632
Adj. R2 0.300 0.213 0.129 0.127 0.088 0.158
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 5: Models of government responsiveness to information requests, with sample restricted
to topics with lower public potential. Models additionally include the same control variables as
in Table 3, twenty topic probabilities, monthly indicators, and fixed effects for every agency-
topic-year combination. Two-way clustered standard errors on municipality and agency.
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Fourth, we use alternative topic models, setting the number of topics to 19 or 21, instead of
20, to address potential concerns over topic instability (Wilkerson and Casas 2017). Fifth, we
employ separate fixed effects for each agency, topic, and year (rather than for every combination
thereof). Sixth, we instead use more fine-grained fixed effects that make comparisons only
among requests with identical agency, topic, year and similar ‘level of difficulty.’ Seventh, we
take into account potential relationships among the different outcome variables by controlling
for measures of response type in our models of response time, and vice versa. Finally, we
include additional request text-based control variables, assessing the prevalence of misspellings
and irregular capitalization. In all of these checks, the results remain substantially similar.
We next turn to a different approach, employing municipality fixed effects to account for any
unobserved municipal-level characteristics, while also identifying results based solely on over-
time changes within each municipality. That is, the coefficient on government vote share in these
models is primarily informed by changes at the 2012 election, before which its value reflects the
PAN vote share and after which its value reflects the PRI vote share in each municipality. If
our first hypothesis is correct, then requests from a largely pro-PAN municipality should receive
more favorable responses before 2012, and less favorable responses afterwards, and vice versa
for a largely pro-PRI municipality. Table 6 presents the results of models including municipality
fixed effects, in addition to the other control variables in the models from Table 3, as well as
fixed effects for every agency-topic combination. We do not incorporate fixed effects for year, in
order to capture within-municipality variation over time in political alignment. In four of the six
models, the coefficient on government vote share is statistically significant, in all four cases at a
p < .01 level. We further test Hypothesis 2 in the municipality-fixed effects approach (Appendix
A), and find that the effects of political alignment are stronger among topics of information with
higher public potential, than those with lower public potential.
To assess the substantive sizes of these effects, we compare the responses to hypothetical
requests from municipalities with governing party vote shares of 0.25 and 0.75, based on the
main results in Table 3. A request from the more government-opposed municipality would be
4.9% more likely to receive a response later than 20 working days, 13.5% more likely to receive
a response later than 40 working days, 19.8% more likely to receive a response claiming that
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Gov. Vote Share −0.291∗∗ −0.143∗∗ −0.065∗∗ −0.035∗∗ 0.001 −0.014
(0.058) (0.030) (0.020) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010)
Dependent Variable LogDays Late20 Late40 Inexist. Classif. NonElec.
DV Mean 2.561 0.332 0.100 0.056 0.032 0.042
Num. obs. 456747 456747 456747 456747 456747 456747
Adj. R2 0.263 0.194 0.130 0.086 0.067 0.099
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 6: Models of government responsiveness to information requests, including municipality
fixed effects. Models additionally include the same control variables as in Table 3, twenty topic
probabilities, monthly indicators, and fixed effects for every agency-topic combination. Two-
way clustered standard errors on municipality and agency.
the information does not exist, and 12.8% more likely to receive a non-electronic response.18
Further, these effects are larger for the sample of topics with higher public potential.
We emphasize that these represent average effects, across a wide variety of agencies, time
periods, and topics of information. Many requests will be routine, and pose no chance of acti-
vating a consideration of political risk on the part of officials. Only for some subset of requests
would we expect any chance of officials considering the identity of the requester or the political
alignment of their location in the first place. We are thus capturing differences averaged across
a set of requests that falls within the scope conditions of our argument, and a set of requests that
falls outside those scope conditions. While we differentiate between two sets of requests based
on the likely public potential of their topics, this can only capture a partial level of detail.
While we do not wish to engage in “cherry-picking” subsets of our data without a priori
theoretical reasons, we do offer one illustrative example of a subset of information requests with
results indicating much stronger effects of local political alignment. In Appendix A, we present
results for a sample of only requests filed with Petróleos Mexicanos, or PEMEX, the state oil
company (and again omitting requests filed from the Federal District). All coefficients are much
larger in magnitude than in the main results from Table 2. Comparing hypothetical requests
18Percentage increases on the baseline probability of each outcome. We skip classified re-
sponses as we find no significant effects in line with our expectations for this outcome-type.
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from municipalities with varying vote shares as above, our results suggest that a request from
the more government-opposed municipality would be 19% more likely to receive a response
later than 20 working days, 31.1% more likely to receive a response later than 40 working days,
44.6% more likely to receive a response claiming that the information does not exist, and 78.6%
more likely to receive a non-electronic response. This illustration suggests that the extent of
political discrimination is much stronger than our primary results suggest for some agencies,
types of information, or specific time periods. On the other hand, many other types of requests
are routine and likely to be handled in a purely impartial manner, and some entire agencies may
be fully professionalized and impartial such that they allow no discrimination whatsoever.
Conclusion
We study responsiveness in the provision of government information, using publicly avail-
able data containing every information request filed with Mexican federal government agencies
from 2003 to 2015. Similar to studies of distributive policies, we analyze how responsiveness
is shaped by discretionary partisan bias. Yet while something of a consensus in the distribu-
tive politics literature has emerged that politicians target core supporters with private benefits –
useful in clientelistic exchange – more than public goods, we find the opposite. Officials favor
areas of core support with information that lends itself to generating public accountability and
demonstrate little to no partisan bias in the provision of information useful in generating private
benefits for the requester.
Underlying these findings are multiple countervailing incentives confronting the agents of
accountability who are charged with responding to information requests. Although ostensibly
institutions of downwards accountability, as well as horizontally accountable to the oversight
body IFAI, officials are also accountable upwards to their agency heads and politicians with
electoral incentives. These multiple forms of accountability create different motivations for and
against disclosure in different circumstances. Favoring disclosure, they may be motivated by an
interest in sustaining a positive image of their ministries, career incentives based on performance,
sanctions for noncompliance, or personal commitment to transparency. The main incentives
disfavoring disclosure are the political risk associated with releasing evidence of corruption or
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poor governance to the general public, along with the needs to comply with official exemptions,
and cope with limited capacity. While agencies certainly could exercise partisan discretion in
delivering information useful for reaping private benefits, they instead exercise caution in the
provision of information that has public potential, given the high cost associated with scandals.
By incorporating information on the topics, complexity, sensitivity, and sophistication of re-
quests, and making comparisons only among requests filed with the same government agency,
on the same topic, and in the same year, we address concerns over underlying differences in
the requests themselves. We find evidence that municipalities with higher vote shares for the
President’s party receive more favorable responses, across multiple measures of responsiveness.
However, this finding holds only for requests on topics of information with higher public poten-
tial, and not for more private topics of information.
Our findings demonstrate that, even in a relatively routine mode of citizen-government inter-
action featuring decentralized decisions made by large numbers of officials, ruling-party interests
and the need to manage political risks can generate dynamics of responsiveness favoring areas
of core government support. These findings also suggest that, despite formal rules intended to
preserve requester anonymity and procedural fairness in Mexico, informal political dynamics
shape bureaucratic processes and allow political discrimination to take place. Yet, on the other
hand, we find no evidence of a clientelistic logic in the discretionary disclosure of information
to confer private benefits. This suggests some success in insulating accountability mechanisms
from patronage politics, yet their replacement with partisan bias of a different form.
Our results, we believe, are applicable well beyond the case of Mexico. We would expect
to find similar bias in responsiveness to citizen information requests in any system featuring the
means (functioning ATI institutions), motive (electoral or institutional sanctions for politicians),
and opportunity (bureaucratic discretion and compromised anonymity) for such discrimination.
This includes a wide variety of democratic and non-democratic regimes. To be sure, geographic
targeting on the basis of electoral returns is not the only strategy available to officials to dis-
criminate in disclosure; they may also base decisions on other cues that signal the provenance
of the request, such as the sophistication of the language, signals of insider knowledge, or even
the precise identity of the requester—as in Roberts’ (2005) study of Canada. However, given
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the politically damaging nature of corruption revelations in even the most mature democracies,
we expect the filtering of potentially damaging information to be a primary consideration in
discretionary disclosure.
Reforms aimed at minimizing such abuses could include measures to insulate bureaucrats
charged with handling information requests from partisan motives, strengthen oversight agencies
to detect and sanction noncompliance, and better procedural protections for citizen anonymity.
However, such policies are typically much easier to propose than to meaningfully establish.
More broadly, the problem of discretionary responsiveness in institutions of accountability
is a particularly daunting challenge for all democracies, transitional democracies in particular.
Institutions created or strengthened through “second-generation” democratization—such as anti-
corruption agencies, state auditors, and judiciaries—have proven quite resistant to attempts to
augment their autonomy and aggressiveness (O’Donnell 1998). Our findings extend this concern
to transparency institutions, demonstrating how an institution designed to empower citizens to
hold politicians accountable can be utilized by state actors as a tool of selective responsiveness.
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